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Abstract
This study investigates whether a popular stated preference method, the choice
experiment (CE), reliably measures individuals’ values for a good. We address
this question using an induced value experiment. Our results indicate that CEs
fail to elicit payoff maximizing choices. We find little evidence that increasing the
salience of the choices or adding monetary incentives increase the proportion of
payoff maximizing choices. This questions the increasing use of CE to value non-
market goods for policy making.
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1 Introduction
Choice Experiments (CEs) are a popular stated preference method that is applied in
economics to value public or publicly-provided goods. CEs are based on Lancaster’s
theory of value and describe goods as a composite of several attributes or characteristics
(Lancaster, 1966). For example, health care goods are described by their survival benefits,
quality of life improvements or side-effects (de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012) or environmental
policies by the land area protected, number of animals saved, etc (Kanninen, 2006). CE
practitioners infer respondents’ value of attributes and calculate welfare estimates, such
as willingness to pay (WTP) by observing choices between priced alternatives presented
in questionnaires.
The methodological debate about CEs has focussed on the gap between choices with and
without monetary incentives, i.e. hypothetical bias (Johansson-Stenman and Svedsa¨ter,
2008; Lusk and Schroeder, 2004) and how to mitigate it (Carlsson et al., 2005), how to
select the goods presented in the CE questionnaire (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2003), and
the estimation of appropriate statistical models (see, e.g., Hole, 2011, in this journal).
These studies use indirect tests because the researchers do not control for individuals’
preferences, and therefore do not know how the attributes, and goods, are valued.
We provide a complementary, direct stress test of CE reliability. We bring CEs into
the lab and use financial rewards to create individuals’ preferences for the goods being
evaluated instead of using homegrown preferences (Smith, 1976). We test the reliability
of CEs when choices are hypothetical and real, i.e. rewarded with monetary incentives
(see Harrison (2006) for a discussion of incentive compatibility in CEs). Our experimental
results suggest that CEs fail to elicit individual’s values in a simple induced value private
good setting.
2 Experimental design
The induced value experiment we use mimics the salient features of a CE. Subjects’
preferences are induced for a multi-attribute laboratory good, we refer to this as a token.
A token has four attributes and each attribute has three levels: colour (red, yellow, blue);
shape (circle, triangle, square); size (small, medium, large); and cost (see third column of
Table 1). The value to subjects of each token depends on the token’s attributes. The total
reward, or payoff, that subjects receive from a given token is the sum of the attributes’
induced values minus the cost. As is typical in a CE questionnaire, tokens are arranged
into choice sets of three alternatives – two tokens and an opt-out. Subjects choose one
of three actions: buy token A, buy token B or buy no token (opt-out). The tokens and
choices sets were selected using a fractional factorial design. Subjects complete a series
of nine choices, and the choices are randomised across subjects.
To retain the hypothetical nature of CE questionnaires, in the baseline treatment choices
are hypothetical. Subjects are paid £10 for participating in the experiment, irrespective
of their choices. The instruction sheet is framed using subjective language: subjects
are asked to “Put yourself in a situation where your account balance at the end of the
experiment would depend on the choice you made...” (Taylor et. al., 2001).
Subjects were recruited from students at the University of Aberdeen during academic
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Table 1: Induced values for baseline and wide treatments.
Token attributes Level baseline (£) wide (£)
Size Small 1.00 0.50
Medium 2.00 2.50
Large 3.00 4.00
Colour Red 0.50 1.00
Yellow 1.00 1.50
Blue 1.50 2.00
Shape Circle 1.00 1.50
Triangle 1.50 3.00
Square 2.00 6.00
Cost 2.00 2.00
3.00 3.00
4.00 4.00
year 2009/10 using the Exlab software3. The experiment was programmed and conducted
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before the experiment began each subject
received a consent form, a set of instructions for the experiment, and a payment form.
Subjects read and signed the consent form, which was collected before the experiment
started. Following this the researcher read the instruction sheet aloud to the group and
answered any questions that subjects had.
3 Results
The payoff maximising token in each choice set can be identified from the induced val-
ues. Table 2 shows the subjects’ payoffs from each token in the nine choice sets, the
payoff difference between the tokens, and the proportion of subjects who chose the payoff
maximising token.
At the aggregate level, the results are two-fold. First, only two thirds of choices are payoff
maximizing. Second, the proportion of payoff maximizing choices varies across choice sets.
In response to choice set C, 34.0% of subjects made a payoff maximizing choice. This is
in contrast to choice set I in which 82.9% made payoff maximizing choices. Choice set C
is notable for the low proportion of payoff maximizing choices. The choice sets with the
highest proportion of payoff maximizing choices (B and I) have a high payoff difference
between the tokens or contain tokens with zero or very small payoffs.
At the subject level, we compute the proportion of payoff maximizing choices that each
subject made during the experiment. Figure 1 presents the Probability Distribution
Function and the Cumulative Distribution Function of these proportions. In Figure 1.b,
each bullet corresponds to a subject. Only two subjects made nine payoff maximizing
choices and 16 subjects (34%) made eight payoff maximizing choices. Around 50% of
subjects made strictly less than seven payoff maximizing choices.
3Students logging on to University computers see a virtual notice board that includes adverts about
participating in economics experiments. Students register with Exlab and then receive emails notifying
them of experiments they can participate in. While many subjects had participated in other experiments,
no subject had participated in any similar experiment.
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Table 2: Token payoffs and the proportion of payoff maximising choices across choice sets
(Baseline treatment)
Choice Payoff - token A Payoff - token B Payoff Diff Baseline Baseline-Monetary
N=47 N=53
Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
A 2.50 1.5 1 31 (65.9) 39 (73.6)
B 0 4 4 37 (78.7) 38 (71.6)
C 2 2.5 0.5 16 (34.0) 16 (30.2)
D -1 4 5 35 (74.5) 40 (75.5)
E 2.5 1.5 1 32 (68.1) 32 (60.4)
F 0.5 1 0.5 31 (65.9) 32 (60.4)
G 3 1.5 1.5 33 (70.2) 42 (79.2)
H 1.5 -1 2.5 34 (72.3) 33 (62.3)
I 3 0.5 2.5 39 (82.9) 37 (69.8)
Overall (%) 66.19% 64.78%
Figure 1: Empirical distribution function of percentage of payoff maximizing choices in
the Baseline and Wide treatments
(a) Probability Distribution Function (b) Cumulative Distribition Function
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3.1 Salience of attributes levels
The above results suggest that choices may be easier when the payoff difference between
tokens is large. In the wide treatment, we induce larger payoff differences by making the
level differences within an attribute more salient (Louviere et al , 2008). Attribute levels
for the wide treatment are presented in the fourth column of Table 1. For example, the
difference between a small and a large token is £3.50 in the wide treatment and £2 in
the baseline treatment.
Table 3 shows the subjects’ payoffs and the proportion of payoff maximizing choices
for the wide treatment. The overall proportion of payoff maximizing choices decreases
compared to the baseline to 56.26%. A bootstrap test of proportion that accounts for
within subject correlation indicates this decrease is significant with p = .072.
Again, the proportion of payoff maximizing choices varies across the choice sets. In choice
sets A and C 14.9% of subjects made a payoff maximizing choice. This is in contrast
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Table 3: Token payoffs and the proportion of payoff maximizing choices across choice sets
(Wide treatment)
Choice Payoff - token A Payoff - token B Payoff Diff Wide Wide-Monetary
N=47 N=54
Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
A 5.5 6.5 1 7 (14.9) 5 (9.3)
B 2.5 9.5 7 18 (38.3) 18 (33.3)
C 3.5 8 4.5 7 (14.9) 15 (27.7)
D -0.5 7 7.5 36 (76.5) 46 (85.2)
E 8 3 5 34 (72.3) 40 (74.1)
F 4.5 3 1.5 34 (72.3) 40 (74.1)
G 6 4 2 35 (74.4) 44 (81.5)
H 3 0.5 2.5 32 (68.1) 43 (79.6)
I 8 1 7 35 (74.4) 40 (74.1)
Overall (%) 56.26% 59.87%
to choice set D, in which 76.5% made a payoff maximizing choice. Compared to the
baseline treatment, choice sets A and C had lower proportions of payoff maximizing
choices and no choice sets had a higher proportion of payoff maximising choices.
In the wide treatment, three choice sets A, B and C are notable for the low proportion of
payoff maximizing choices, 14.9%, 38.3% and 14.9% respectively. The payoff differences
in these choice sets ranges from £1 to £7, but in all three choice sets token A’s payoff
while positive and large is lower than token B’s payoff.
In Figure 1, the CDF of percentage of payoff maximizing choices in the Wide treatment is
plotted against the CDF in the Baseline treatment. No-one in the Wide makes strictly
more than seven payoff maximizing choices. The Baseline CDF first order dominates
the Wide CDF with p = .003. Subjects are more successful in making payoff maximizing
choices in the Baseline rather than in the Wide treatment.
3.2 Monetary incentives
All choices in the previous treatments are hypothetical. Subjects face no real economic
commitments in making payoff maximizing choices. We replicate the Baseline and
Wide treatments with monetary incentives.
In the incentivized treatments, subjects earnings from the experiment depend on the
choices they make. To ensure all subjects receive compensation for their time, each
subject receives £2 for showing up on time and participating. In addition to this show-up
fee, subjects are given an account with £4 in it, and they can use this money to buy
the tokens that are offered for sale in the choice sets. All tokens in the experiment cost
£4 or less (Table 1), therefore subjects can afford to buy all tokens offered. If subjects’
earnings or losses in each choice accumulated over the experiment then their behavior in
later choices may be influenced by threshold wealth or other strategic effects. To prevent
this, subjects’ earnings from the experiment depend only on their choice in one randomly
chosen choice set. This choice set was chosen at random by the computer at the end
of the experiment4. In all other respects the incentivized treatment is identical to the
4We acknowledge that subjects may not believe that the computer made this random choice. A more
transparent approach would be to use a die and roll this in front of subjects.
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Figure 2: Empirical distribution function of percentage of payoff maximizing choices in
the Baseline and Wide treatments
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hypothetical treatment.
The results are unchanged with the addition of monetary incentives. The last column of
Tables 2 and 3 present the aggregate results by choice set and overall. The proportions of
payoff maximising choices are only marginally affected by the monetary incentives. We
observe a 2% decrease in the proportion of payoff maximizing choices in the baseline and
a 3.5% increase in the Wide treatments. The proportion of payoff maximising choices
varies across the choice sets. In Figure 2 we plot the CDFs of the percentage of payoff
maximizing choices by subjects with and without monetary incentives. This confirms the
aggregate results: the CDFs are not significantly different with p = .778 and p = .437
in the Baseline and Wide treatments, respectively. Monetary incentives do not engage
subjects in making more payoff maximizing choices, whether or not they are combined
with increased salience in the attribute levels.
4 Comparison of estimated WTP and induced values
In this section, we consider the implications for the welfare estimates of mistakenly in-
cluding non-payoff maximising choices in econometric estimations. To do this, we analyse
our data as though it were from a CE survey using a conditional logit model.5 The de-
pendent variable is subjects’ token choice and the regressors are token cost and dummy
variables representing the levels of the tokens’ attributes. We calculate subjects’ esti-
mated marginal WTP for a token level compared to the omitted token level using the
estimated coefficients from the conditional logit model. We compare estimated marginal
WTP and the induced value differences between token levels using Wald tests.
Table 4 presents the induced value differences and estimated marginal WTPs6 for the
5The conditional logit is the standard model used to analyse CE data. Extensions to the conditional
logit, such as the random parameters logit, are increasingly used in applied research. These models allow
for issues, such as preference heterogeneity, that are not relevant in our setting.
6The conditional logit model estimation results are available from the authors on request.
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Table 4: Induced values and estimated willingness to pay across treatments
Hypothetical Incentivised
Attribute Level Ind. Value Diff. Estim. WTP (s.e.) Wald p-value Estim. WTP (s.e.) Wald p-value
Baseline
Size Small - Omitted level
Medium 1.00 0.55 (0.588) .435 1.21 (0.612) .728
Large 2.00 2.59 (0.766) .443 3.76 (0.868) .042
Colour Red . Omitted level
Yellow 0.50 2.00 (0.551) .006 1.21 (0.471) .131
Blue 1.00 2.30 (0.554) .018 1.86 (0.478) .072
Shape Circle - Omitted level
Triangle 0.50 0.26 (0.543) .657 1.16 (0.582) .252
Square 1.00 0.54 (0.437) .301 0.65 (0.432) .423
Wide
Size Small - Omitted level -
Medium 1.00 0.84 (0.464) .012 1.60 (0.427) .351
Large 2.00 1.03 (0.491) .000 2.25 (0.493) .011
Colour Red - Omitted level
Yellow 0.50 -0.21 (0.377) .059 -0.97 (0.331) .000
Blue 1.00 1.22 (0.405) .579 1.13 (0.327) .669
Shape Circle - Omitted level
Triangle 0.50 2.70 (0.655) .067 3.01 (0.570) .008
Square 1.00 1.44 (0.451) .000 1.41 (0.368) .000
attribute levels for each of the four treatments.7 Results indicate that econometric re-
gressions often fail to retrieve induced value differences. In the Baseline, Wald tests
reject the null of equality between marginal WTPs and induced value differences for the
color attribute in the hypothetical treatment and equality is rejected for the large level of
the size attribute and the blue level of colour attribute in the incentivised treatment. In
the Wide treatments, estimations are more misleading as Wald tests reject the null for
almost all attribute levels. This is not surprising as the proportion of payoff maximising
choices are lower in Wide treatments than in Baseline treatments.
5 Conclusion
We find that CEs fail to elicit payoff maximizing choices. There is little evidence that
increasing the salience of attribute levels, engaging subjects with monetary incentives, or
both increases the proportion of payoff maximizing choices. Overall, payoff maximizing
choices range from only 56.3% to 85.2% of choices, depending on the treatment considered.
Problematic choice sets, in our setting, are those in which token A has a significant positive
pay-off, but still a lower pay-off than that of token B. This indicates that decision rules
other than optimisation are applied by subjects when completing the task presented in
CEs. Econometric results indicate that this phenomenon is not innocuous for welfare
estimations.
Our results suggest that, despite their increasing popularity, CEs should be applied with
caution. However, we believe that our experimental framework may be useful as a test
bed for CE questionnaires in a controlled environment, before they are carried out in the
field.
7A LR test rejects the null of equality of parameters between the Baseline hypothetical and real
treatments (p = .014). Equality is not rejected for the Wide treatments (p = .506).
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